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Constitutional Law-First Amendment-NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT OF
ABORTION REFERRAL SERVICE ENTITLED TO FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION-Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975).
Controversies involving the first amendment' rights of freedom of press
and speech are not confined to reporters vowing to protect the identities
of their sources against government prosecutors or committees attempting
to identify them.3 An area of conflict of equal import is the degree of
protection, if any, afforded commercial speech by the Constitution.4 In
1942, the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen enunciated' the
commercial speech doctrine7 which has been used,8 despite subsequent
criticism and attempts to limit the holding,' to remove commercial adver-
tisement from the ambit of constitutional protection.
The Chrestensen holding followed a series of decisions known as the
Handbill Cases" which had overturned convictions of persons prosecuted
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I reads in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." First amendment freedoms are protected from state
infringement by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1959); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925). VA. CONST. art. I, §12 reads in part: "[Tihe General Assembly shall
not pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . .. ."
2. The rights of free speech and press are coextensive, being distinguished only by the
"form of utterance." Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F.2d 860, 865 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 693 (1926) (emphasis added). "[Tihese [rights], though not identical, are insepara-
ble." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
3. For information concerning the issue of newsmen's privilege see United States v. Cald-
well, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Comment, Newsman's Privilege: The First Amendment Grants
None, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 381 (1973).
4. DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HAST. L.J. 745
(1975) [hereinafter cited as DeVore & Nelson].
5. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The facts of the case appear infra, note 11.
6. DeVore & Nelson, supra note 4, at 747-48.
7. 316 U.S. at 54. The Court, after reiterating past decisions which gave constitutional
protection to the exercise of freedom of speech and which allowed government regulation"appropriately" and "in the public interest," stated: "[W]e are equally clear that the Con-
stitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertis-
ing." Id.
8. See note 14 infra.
9. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (The "holding was ill-conceived and has not weathered subsequent scrutiny.");
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The
ruling was casual, almost off-hand."); 48 TUL. L. REv. 426, 431 (1974) (The "Chrestensen
decision regulated the mode of distribution . . . not. . . content.").
10. E.g., Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938). For a discussion of the Handbill Cases see Redish, The First Amendment in
the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 429, 448-50 (1971).
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for violating ordinances prohibiting on-the-street distribution of pam-
phlets or handbills. Chrestensen, however, upheld an ordinance which
prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills." Despite the fact that
the narrow holding of Chrestensen allowed regulation of manner of distri-
bution, rather than content of the advertisement, 2 the commercial speech
doctrine lived on. What had been a "casual, almost offhand decision"
which "has not survived reflection"" was repeatedly cited as authority for
upholding state or local regulations banning commercial speech in gen-
eral.' 4 For thirty-three years, until the case of Bigelow v. Virginia," the
Supreme Court refused to qualify Chrestensen by limiting it to its facts.
Jeffrey C. Bigelow, the managing editor of a weekly newspaper published
in Charlottesville, Virginia, was convicted of violating a Virginia statute'
which made it a misdemeanor to encourage or promote the processing of
11. The case involved the constitutionality of a provision of New York City's sanitary code
forbidding street distribution of business advertising matter. Appellee Chrestensen was told
that distribution of leaflets advertising the exhibition of a former Navy submarine which he
now owned and from which he profited would violate the ordinance. After being told hand-
bills solely devoted to information or public protest were not subject to the ordinance, Chres-
tensen prepared a second handbill with the original advertisement on one side, and a public
protest on the other. Because of the presence of the advertisement on one side, Chrestensen
was restrained from distributing the handbills by the police. He succeeded in his suit to enjoin
interference with the distribution and, following an affirmance by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court cited the commercial nature of the
advertisement and reversed.
12. Devore & Nelson, supra note 4, at 748; 48 TuL. L. REv. supra note 9, at 428.
13. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
14. See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971);
Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969).
15. 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Repl. Vol. 1960). The statute at the time of Bigelow's arrest
read:
If any person by publication, lecture, advertisement or by sale or circulation of any
publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The General Assembly of Virginia amended the statute, restricting its application, with
respect to advertisement, to an abortion illegal in Virginia and to be performed there. The
statute, as amended by Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 725 now reads in part:
If any person. . . by advertisement. . . encourages or promotes the processing of
an abortion or miscarriage to be performed in this state which is prohibited under this
article, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The state in oral argument described the pre-1972 form of the statute as "effectively repealed
by amendment." The Court citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held the amended
statute as "limited to an abortion performed by a nonphysician." Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment 38-39. "In any event there is no dispute here that the amended statute would not reach
appellant's advertisement." 95 S. Ct. at 2228 n.3 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 10:427
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an abortion. Bigelow's newspaper'7 ran an advertisement giving, among
other information, the name, address and telephone number of an abortion
referral service in New York, where both abortions and the referral service
were lawful. 8 Three months after the publication, Bigelow was charged
with violating the statute. 9 He was convicted in the County Court of
Albemarle County and by right of appeal obtained a de novo trial in the
circuit court."0 The court rejected his claim that the statute was unconsti-
tutional and found him guilty. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.2 ' Bigelow made two arguments before the court. He claimed his
first amendment rights of freedom of speech and press were violated by the
statute, and that the statute was overboard, in that it not only regulated
non-protected speech, but that which was clearly within the ambit of the
Constitution."
Citing Chrestensen, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Bigelow's
first amendment claim, calling the advertisement "commercial" which"may be constitutionally prohibited by the state." Citing the state's goal
of insuring pregnant women the choice of whether or not to have an abor-
tion without the pressure of commercial advertisement, the court held the
statute a valid exercise of state police power.24 Turning to the "over-
breadth" claim, the court held that since Bigelow's activity "was of a
purely commercial nature," he had no "standing to rely upon the hypo-
thetical rights of those in the non-commercial zone."" The United States
17. Jeffrey C. Bigelow was a director, managing editor, and "responsible officer" of the
newspaper.
18. Subsequent to Bigelow's publication of the advertisement, the State of New York
adopted Laws 1971, ch. 725, effective July 1, 1971, now codified as art. 45, § 4501 of the State's
Public Health Law. The statute makes illegal and against public policy referral services which
are organized as profit-making enterprises. The statute does not apply to non-profit corpora-
tions. 95 S. Ct. at 2233 n.8.
19. According to the oral argument transcript Bigelow's is perhaps the only prosecution in
the then ninety-eight year history of the statute. Transcript of Oral Argument *at 40, quoted
at 95 S. Ct. at 2228.
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-132, -136 (Repl. Vol. 1975). These statutes give any person
convicted in a court not of record the right to appeal to the circuit court of the county. The
appeal shall be in the form of a trial de novo. See, e.g., Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209
Va. 695, 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969).
21. 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
22. As mentioned in note 30 infra, the issue of the statute's "overbreadth" was rendered'moot with its amendment in such a manner as to repeal its prior application. There is no
possibility now that the statute's pre-1972 form will be applied again to Bigelow or will chill
the rights of others. 95 S. Ct. at 2230.
23. 213 Va. at 193-95, 191 S.E.2d at 174-76.
24. Id. at 196-97, 191 S.E.2d at 174-76.
25. Id. at 198, 191 S.E.2d at 177-78.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari, but during pendency, Roe v. Wade"
(which in effect overturned Virginia's and every other state's anti-abortion
statute) was decided. The Court then vacated Bigelow's conviction and
remanded the case for consideration in light of the new abortion ruling.?
The Virginia Supreme Court held that Roe v. Wade did not involve abor-
tion advertising and affirmed the conviction.28 Again, the United States
Supreme Court granted review. 9
The thrust of the Court's analysis and the importance of its decision lies
with the first amendment claim of the newspaper publisher in light of the
commercial speech doctrine."0 The analysis consisted of a two-tiered ques-
tion. First, does the first amendment with its guarantees of freedom of
speech and press reach commercial advertisement? Second, if so, are there
governmental interests which in this case outweigh the need for constitu-
tional protection?
The Court answered the first tier of the question in the affirmative.
Relying on Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations3' and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3" the Court stated em-
phatically: "[S]peech is not stripped of First Amendment protection sim-
ply because it appears in [commercial] form. 3 3 Mr. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the seven member majority, rejected the Virginia Supreme
Court's reliance on Chrestensen (calling its holding distinctly limited) and
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. 413 U.S. 909 (1973).
28. 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
29. 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
30. Therefore this note will not analyze the Court's rejection of the Virginia Supreme
Court's holding that Mr. Bigelow lacked standing to attack the statute as being overbroad.
Here the Court disposed of the issue by citing the principles of "established cases" (including
a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court) which specify requirements of standing.
The Court consistently has permitted attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with requisite narrow specificity. Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), quoted at 95 S. Ct. at 2229 (footnotes
omitted).
Of course, in order to have standing, an individual must present more than 'allega-
tions of a substantive chill.' There must be a 'claim of specific present objective harm.'
That requirement, however, surely is met under circumstances of this case, where the
threat of prosecution already has blossomed into the reality of a conviction . . . . 95
S. Ct. at 2230.
The Virginia case noted is Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d 477 (1971). Since
the Virginia statute has been effectively repealed, the Court considered as moot the question
of its overbreadth.
31. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
32. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
33. 95 S. Ct. at 2231.'
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severely narrowed the scope of the commercial speech doctrine." The sec-
ond tier of the inquiry involved a balancing of the individual's interest in
free speech against that of the state in exercising its police power. 5 Here
the Court set definitive guidelines for future commercial speech cases by
specifying particular factors to be taken into consideration and assigning
a discernible weight to each. The crucial factors were the presence of mat-
ters of public interest in the advertisement, the legal status of the adver-
tised activity, and the legitimacy of the state's interests in controlling
speech in the particular controversy. 6
Assigned great weight was the fact that the advertisement contained
information of potential interest and value to the public,37 in contrast to a
strictly commercial transaction." Thus, an examination of the subject of
the advertisement was critical; there was no other means for the Court to
determine whether it is of public interest.3 9 Of equal importance was the
34. "[T]he fact that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that
Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertis-
ing are immune from constitutional challenge." Id.
35. It is significant that a seven member majority of the Burger Court agreed to decide the
first amendment issue by balancing the competing interests considering the strong disdain
of the late era of the Warren Court for this approach in favor of an absolute categorization of
the activity involved. These categories, which have also been noted in early Burger Court
decisions, are identified in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949). For a discussion of the balancing versus categorization methods see Ely, Flag Dese-
cration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing
Court: The Case of Mr. Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972).
For one criticism of the balancing approach see Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 60-80 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-
44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 86 (1966).
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2232-33.
37. The Court held the advertisement:
[C]ontained factual material of clear 'public interest' . it involved the exercise of
freedom of communicating information ... which was ... not unnewsworthy...
[and] the activity advertised pertained to constitutional interests .... Thus...
appellant's First Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of
the general public. Id.
38. "Only a few cases define the term 'commercial advertisement' for purposes of the First
Amendment." Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1124, 1132 (1972). See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-88 (1973); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
39. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist makes the following statement concerning the
majority's scrutiny of the ad's content: "If the Court's decision does indeed turn upon its
conclusion that the advertisement here in question was protected by the First and Fourteenth
1976]
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fact that abortions and referral services were legal in New York at the
time the advertisement appeared in the newspaper. 0 The Court stated
that first amendment interests are "altogether absent when the commer-
cial activity itself is illegal."'" Since the activity in question was legal and
of public interest the first amendment protection attached. The inquiry
then turned to whether Virginia's interests outweighed the need for con-
stitutional protection. The Court reasoned that the Commonwealth of
Virginia had a legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of medical
care within its own borders,4" but noted that the activity in question, the
referral service, was not based in Virginia but in another state.43 The
Court held that in attempting to exercise its police powers under these
circumstances the state was actually "asserting an interest in regulating
what Virginians may hear or read about the New York services."44 Thus
interpreted, this interest was invalid and "entitled to little, if any, weight
under the circumstances. 4 5 The Court held, therefore, that Bigelow's
advertisement was protected by the Constitution and that Virginia could
not apply the statute as it read in 1971 without violating his first amend-
ment rights. With the holding came a warning: "[L]iberty of the press is
in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into a
newspaper.""
Bigelow is an important decision for two reasons. First, the predictions
of apparent immortality of Mr. Chrestensen" and the commercial speech
doctrine have been proved unfounded. Bigelow clearly holds that prior
Amendments, the subject of the advertisement ought to make no difference." 95 S. Ct. at
2237 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This seems to be faulting the Court for not putting the cart
before the ox since the majority did not decide whether the advertisement was in fact pro-
tected until after it decided that the content was of public interest.
If by his statement Justice Rehnquist is advocating categorization of speech to be
absolutely protected he ignores two recent cases involving first amendment claims in which
he joined, stating that public expression may be subject to reasonable regulation. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1973); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974).
40. 95 S. Ct. at 2232-33.
41. Id. at 2232. The court quoted directly from Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 2235.
43. Id. at 2234-35. The Court reasoned:
No claim has been made, however, that this particular advertisement in any way
affected the quality of medical services within Virginia. A State does not acquire power
or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and
health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State.
44. Id. at 2235 (emphasis in original).
45. Id.
46. 2 Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATioNs 633 (1947) quoted at 95 S.
Ct. at 2236.
47. Fear of Mr. Chrestensen's immortality is expressed in 51 N.C.L. REv. 581 (1973).
[Vol. 10:427
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courts erred in their assumptions that advertisement, as such, was entitled
to no first amendment protection."8 Although it was unnecessary to over-
rule Chrestensen, the Court did forestall its citation as authority for blan-
ket removal of advertisements from constitutional protection. Future
courts will be forced to search for valid reasons behind regulations and
close scrutiny of unique factual situations will likely become the rule in
commercial speech cases. Second, the Court felt compelled to decide the
case by direct confrontation with the first amendment issue and balancing
competing interests, rather than applying the overbreadth doctrine to the
statute. It is of course impossible to predict whether Mr. Justice Blackmun
has adopted the balancing technique for all first amendment cases or
merely those involving commercial speech. 9 In any event, his overall ap-
proach 0 was logical, yielding a just result and a standard by which to
predict future first amendment commercial speech controversies.
R.C.
48. Noting the complete absence of Virginia's power to regulate the advertisement in
Bigelow, the Court said it did not need to decide the outcome of a commercial speech case
where the state did have such power. Notwithstanding this statement, the Court set forth
guidelines which seem to indicate that it would confront that task in the same manner it
disposed of Bigelow, i.e., a balance of competing interests. The only difference would be a
more difficult decision since the validity of the state interest might balance the scales, as
opposed to Bigelow where all the weight came down on the side of constitutional protection.
95 S. Ct. at 2234.
49. Mr. Justice Blackmun had argued that the Court's efforts at balancing in a former"speech" case were "misplaced and unnecessary." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27, (1971)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Justice Blackmun's handling of the particular issues in Bigelow showed an ability to
sort out the essential facts and reach a fair result. However, his attempt at balancing was
not as masterful as that of the late Mr. Justice Harlan. He might have noted that the statute
presented Mr. Bigelow with no alternative forum and that the state could have proscribed
less drastic means as an alternative to criminal prosecution such as making the newspaper
vouch for the referral service or hospital.
